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为把脉地方经济和了解政策执行情况，赴基层企业走访视察已成为官员履行行政职能、参与经济决策的一种常态。那么，官员视察是否对企业环境治理行为产生影响呢?利用2016年第12次中国私营企业调查数据(CPES),本文实证分析了官员视察对民营企业环境治理的影响效应和作用机理。研究发现，官员视察对企业环境治理具有显著的促进作用，提高了民营企业环境治理投资水平，在使用一系列稳健性检验后，上述结论依然稳健。此外，作用机制研究发现，官员视察通过增强企业的环境规制压力和治理能力双重路径影响了企业环境治理行为，主要表现为增强企业环境规制压力感强度、提高正规融资便利性和获取市场发展机会。进一步分析发现，地区市场化程度越低、企业融资约束程度越大、企业面临的环境盈亏压力越小，官员视察对企业环境治理的促进作用会越强。本文的研究不仅丰富了政治关系和企业环境治理的相关研究，而且还阐述了官员视察影响企业环境治理的微观机理，这对政府制定环境规制政策、激励企业环境治理具有重要的启示意义。
Abstract：In order to get a sense of the local economy and understand the implementation of policies, official visits and inspections in enterprises have become a norm for officials to perform administrative functions and participate in economic decision-making. Therefore, does official inspections affect corporate environmental governance behavior? Using the data from the 12th China Private Enterprise Survey(CPES) in 2016, this paper empirically analyzes the effect and mechanism of official inspections on the environmental governance of private enterprises. The study finds that official inspections have a significant role in promoting corporate environmental governance, increasing the level of investment in environmental governance of private enterprises, and after using a series of methods, the conclusions are still robust. In addition, the research on the mechanism finds that official inspections strengthen the pressure of corporate environmental regulations, improve the convenience of formal financing, and obtain market development opportunities to promote investment in corporate environmental governance. Further analysis finds that the lower the degree of regional marketization, the greater the degree of corporate financing constraints, and the lower the pressure on environmental profit and loss, the stronger the effect of official visits in promoting corporate environmental governance. The research not only enriches the related research on political connections and corporate environmental governance, but also elaborates the micro-mechanisms of official inspections that affect corporate environmental governance from the perspective of the “combination of blocking and plugging” policy, which have an important implications for the government to formulate environmental regulatory policies and encourage private firms to invest in environmental governance.
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(1)囿于篇幅,部分结果未具体报告,有兴趣请联系作者。
(2)作者感谢审稿专家所提出的建设性意见,即控制“政企关系”因素的影响。
基本信息:
DOI：10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20220927.004
中图分类号:D630;F276.5
引用信息:
[1]毛晖,周红星,黄送钦.官员视察的环境治理效应研究：压力与能力的双重机制检验[J].经济学报,2023,10(03):241-269.DOI:10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20220927.004.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重大项目“政府职能转变的制度红利研究”(18ZDA113); 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金“区域环境规制的绿色增长效应研究——基于环境全要素生产率的视角”(19YJAZH062); 中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助“环境规制、地方政府竞争与中小企业环境治理”(202110403)的资助
2022-09-29
2022-09-29
2022-09-29