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本文使用2007到2016年官员晋升数据与276个地级市面板数据匹配，实证考察环境治理对官员晋升的影响。研究发现：环境治理促进了官员晋升；环境绩效考核和经济绩效考核并存，环境绩效在官员考核中被强化，经济绩效被弱化。从区域角度看，北方地区更强调以经济增长的方式晋升，南方地区注重以环境治理的方式晋升；相比非环境保护重点城市，环境保护重点城市的官员通过环境治理晋升的概率更高。从官员特征看，官员任期越长，环境治理对官员晋升的影响越大；使用逆温作为工具变量，并经过多种稳健性检验后，结论依然成立。本文的政策含义是，应当强化绿色发展理念和环境绩效考核的重要性、调整绩效考核比重，建立“因地制宜”的官员治理体系、建立正式制度和非正式制度相结合的治理体系，激发官员环境治理的内生动力，实现绿色高质量发展。
Abstract：This paper uses the promotion data of officials from 2007 to 2016 to match the panel data of 276 prefecture-level cities to empirically investigate the impact of environmental governance on the promotion of officials. Research findings:Environmental governance promoted the promotion of officials,environmental performance assessment and economic performance assessment coexist,and environmental performance was strengthened,while economic performance was weakened. From the regional point of view,the northern region emphasizes the promotion through economic growth,while the southern region emphasizes the promotion through environmental governance;official in key environmental protection cities are more likely to be promoted through environmental governance than those in non-key environmental protection cities. From the characteristics of officials,the longer the tenure of officials,the greater the impact of environmental governance on the promotion of officials;using thermal inversion as a tool variable and after a variety of robust tests,the conclusions were still established. The policy implication of this paper is:Policymakers should strengthen the importance of green development concept and environmental performance assessment,adjust the proportion of performance assessment,establish the official governance system according to local conditions,and built the governance system by combining formal and informal systems,so as to stimulate the endogenous power of environmental governance of officials and achieve green and highquality development.
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(1)通过计算pm2.5growth的标准差为0.369,0.369×(-0.209)=-0.0771。gdptenure的标准差为1.861,通过计算1.861×0.008=0.0149。
基本信息:
DOI：10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20230215.001
中图分类号:X321;D630
引用信息:
[1]赵丽,胡植尧.环境治理是否促进了地方官员晋升？——基于中国地级市样本的实证研究[J].经济学报,2023,10(02):153-174.DOI:10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20230215.001.
基金信息:
中国社会科学院大学（研究生院）研究生科研创新支持计划项目“大型平台企业数据确权研究”（2022-KY-118）的资助
2023-02-16
2023-02-16
2023-02-16