信息公开、风险变化与海洋捕捞行为——基于公共池塘资源理论的实验研究Information Disclosure, Risk Change and Fishing Behavior in Marine: Evidence from Experimental Study Based on the Theory of Public Pool Resources
罗俊,刘靖姗,黄佳琦,石荣浩
摘要(Abstract)：
理性经济人会为了个人利益最大化而尽可能多地提取公共资源，从而导致滥用资源的“公地悲剧”现象。海洋资源是典型的公共池塘资源，随着海洋捕捞量的逐年增长，海洋环境正遭受严重的破坏。本文采用实验方法，通过设置是否进入公共池资源的选择和提取资源数量两阶段实验，来研究个体对公共池资源的提取行为。我们还在实验中引入信息和风险这两个重要因素，并特别设计了风险的不同动态变化过程，以研究个体在面对各种风险变化情况下的公共池资源提取策略。实验结果表明，信息公开和风险变化过程都会一定程度影响个体提取资源的选择和资源提取数量。结论可为公共治理提供政策启示，如公开资源提取人数信息有助于个体调整资源提取数量，根据天气变化制定相应资源管理政策可避免个体对风险的错误判断而出现的非理性提取行为。
关键词(KeyWords)： 公共池塘;资源提取;风险变化;信息公开;实验经济学
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目(72473125)的资助
作者(Author): 罗俊,刘靖姗,黄佳琦,石荣浩
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- (1)当风险水平较高时,被试会根据人们风险厌恶的特性,预期本组选择提取资源的人数较少;相反,当风险水平相对较低时,个体会感觉本组选择提取资源的人数较多。