公共部门就业扩张、支出压力与财政收入质量：非税的视角Public Sector Employment Expansion, Expenditure Pressure and Fiscal Revenue Quality: A Non-Tax Perspective
王科斌,缪小林,候永康
摘要(Abstract)：
优化财政收入结构、提升财政收入质量是健全现代财税制度的重要内容。本文研究公共部门就业扩张对非税收入增长的影响及机理。结果表明，公共部门就业扩张是非税收入增长、财政收入质量不佳的重要动因。机理在于，公共部门就业扩张加剧了支出压力，表现为财政支出尤其是行政管理等自利性财政支出增长，进而倒逼非税收入增长。进一步地，从非税收入的子类来看，公共部门就业扩张更会影响罚没收入、行政事业性收费和专项收入，而在非税中本应承担收入增长效应的国有资本经营、国有资源出让等收入却不受影响。本文从加强编制监管、优化征管结构和统筹征收主体等方面，提供了完善非税收入管理以提升财政收入质量的政策建议。
关键词(KeyWords)： 公共部门;就业扩张;支出压力;财政收入质量;非税收入
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重点项目“增强公共服务均衡性和可及性研究”(项目号:23AZD055);国家社会科学基金一般项目“社会性流动视角下劳动力供需匹配机制及对策研究”(项目号:20BRK006)的资助
作者(Author): 王科斌,缪小林,候永康
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- (1)非税收入是指除税收以外,由各级政府、国家机关、事业单位、代行政府职能的社会团体及其他组织依法利用政府权力、政府信誉、国家资源、国有资产或提供特定公共服务、准公共服务取得并用于满足社会公共需要或准公共需要的财政资金,是政府财政收入的重要组成部分,是政府参与国民收入分配和再分配的一种形式。而其征管范围包括:行政事业性收费、政府性基金、国有资源有偿使用收入、国有资产有偿使用收入、国有资本经营收益、彩票公益金、罚没收入、以政府名义接受的捐赠收入、主管部门集中收入以及政府财政资金产生的利息收入等。 (2)绘图所使用的县级样本是平衡面板下的2586个县域(含区、县及县级市等),2001—2009年数据来源于《全国地市县财政统计资料》、2010—2011年数据是作者团队调研所得。 (3)前文表3列(1)展示了一阶段回归结果,证实公共部门就业扩张与儒家文化满足工具变量相关性条件,在此不再赘述。