张亚涛

• 1:南开大学金融学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文以2008—2020年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，考察了机构交叉持股对企业商誉泡沫的影响。研究发现，交叉持股的机构投资者可以有效抑制企业商誉泡沫；机制研究表明，交叉持股的机构投资者主要通过降低企业代理成本和信息不对称来抑制企业商誉泡沫；进一步研究发现，在内部控制质量和市场化程度较高的企业中，交叉持股的机构投资者对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更为明显。此外，相比一般法人类机构投资者，金融类机构投资者交叉持股对企业商誉泡沫的抑制作用更显著。本文在理论和实证上丰富了机构交叉持股和企业商誉领域的研究，为监管部门和上市公司化解商誉泡沫提供了新思路和新范式。

关键词(KeyWords)： 机构交叉持股;商誉泡沫;代理成本;信息不对称

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 张亚涛

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20220922.001

参考文献(References)：

• 陈耿，严彩红.2020.代理冲突、激励约束机制与并购商誉[J].审计与经济研究，35(2):65-76.Chen G,Yan C H.2020.A research on the relationship between agency conflict,incentive and restraint mechanism and corporate goodwill[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,35(2):65-76.(in Chinese)
• 杜兴强，杜颖洁，周泽将.2011.商誉的内涵及其确认问题探讨[J].会计研究，(1):11-16.Du X Q,Du Y J,Zhou Z J.2011.Study on the connotation and recognition of goodwill[J].Accounting Research,(1):11-16.(in Chinese)
• 杜勇，胡红燕.2022.机构共同持股与企业财务重述[J].证券市场导报，(2):67-79.Du Y,Hu H Y.2022.Common institutional ownership and corporate financial restatement[J].Securities Market Herald,(2):67-79.(in Chinese)
• 冯卫东，郑海英.2013.企业并购商誉计量与披露问题研究[J].财政研究，(8):29-32.Feng W D,Zheng H Y.2013.Research on the measurement and disclosure of measurement of M&A goodwill[J].Public Finance Research,(8):29-32.(in Chinese)
• 傅超，杨曾，傅代国.2015.“同伴效应”影响了企业的并购商誉吗?——基于我国创业板高溢价并购的经验证据[J].中国软科学，(11):94-108.Fu C,Yang Z,Fu D G.2015.Does peer effect affect the goodwill:Empirical evidence from high-premium M&A on the GEM[J].China Soft Science,(11):94-108.(in Chinese)
• 耿建新，丁含.2021.资产评估机构对商誉泡沫的影响及机制研究[J].管理学报，18(11):1730-1738.Geng J X,Ding H.2021.The impact and mechanism of appraisal institutions on goodwill bubble[J].Chinese Journal of Management,18(11):1730-1738.(in Chinese)
• 李璐，姚海鑫.2019.共享审计能抑制并购商誉泡沫吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究，34(5):32-42.Li L,Yao H X.2019.Can shared auditors inhibit M&A goodwill bubbles?The evidence from Chinese listed companies[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,34(5):32-42.(in Chinese)
• 李志辉，杜阳，胡心怡.2021.机构投资者对市场操纵行为是否起到抑制作用[J].国际金融研究，(7):66-75.Li Z H,Du Y,Hu X Y.2021.Can institutional investors restrain market manipulation?[J].Studies of International Finance,(7):66-75.(in Chinese)
• 连玉君，彭方平，苏治.2010.融资约束与流动性管理行为[J].金融研究，(10):158-171.Lian Y J.Peng F P,Su Z.2010.Financing constraints and liquidity management[J].Journal of Financial Research,(10):158-171.(in Chinese)
• 马惠娴，佟爱琴.2019.卖空机制对高管薪酬契约的治理效应——来自融资融券制度的准自然实验[J].南开管理评论，22(2):61-74.Ma H X,Tong A Q.2019.Does short-selling discipline executives by compensation contracts?A natural experiment based on the margin trading in China[J].Nankai Business Review,22(2):61-74.(in Chinese)
• 梅洁，杜亚斌.2012.机构投资者改善信息披露质量的异质性行为研究——来自2004～2010年深市A股的经验证据[J].证券市场导报，(6):31-37.Mei J,Du Y B.2012.Heterogeneous action of institutional investors improving the quality of information disclosure[J].Securities Market Herald,(6):31-37.(in Chinese)
• 梅洁，严华麟.2012.基金持股对信息披露质量的改善作用研究——来自深圳证券交易所2004—2010年上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究，27(2):97-103.Mei J,Yan H L.2012.A research on the improvement effect of fund shareholdings of corporate transparency:Empirical evidence from listed companies of SSE between 2004—2010[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,27(2):97-103.(in Chinese)
• 孟庆斌，李昕宇，张修平.2019.卖空机制、资本市场压力与公司战略选择[J].中国工业经济，(8):155-173.Meng Q B,Li X Y,Zhang X P.2019.Short selling,capital market pressure and corporate strategic choice[J].China Industrial Economics,(8):155-173.(in Chinese)
• 潘越，汤旭东，宁博，等.2020.连锁股东与企业投资效率：治理协同还是竞争合谋[J].中国工业经济，(2):136-164.Pan Y,Tang X D,Ning B,et al.2020.Cross-ownership and corporate investment efficiency:Coordination in governance or collusion in market[J].China Industrial Economics,(8):136-164.(in Chinese)
• 权小锋，吴世农，文芳.2010.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究，45(11):73-87.Quan X F,Wu S N,Wen F.2010.Managerial power,private income and compensation rigging[J].Economic Research Journal,45(11):73-87.(in Chinese)
• 孙诗璐，张斐燕，郑建明，等.2021.放松卖空管制能够抑制并购商誉泡沫吗?[J].金融研究，(11):189-206.Sun S L,Zhang F Y,Zheng J M,et al.2021.Can relaxing short selling constraints inhibit M&A goodwill bubbles?[J].Journal of Financial Research,(11):189-206.(in Chinese)
• 田园，高利芳.2021.卖空管制放松能够抑制企业商誉泡沫吗?[J].财贸研究，32(9):96-110.Tian Y,Gao L F.2021.Can deregulation of short selling inhibit corporate goodwill bubbles?[J].Finance and Trade Research,32(9):96-110.(in Chinese)
• 王鲁泉，张蓓.2021.商誉减值的同伴效应研究[J].中国注册会计师，(7):53-60.Wang L Q,Zhang B.2021.Research on the peer effect of goodwill impairment of listed companies in China[J].The Chinese Certified Public Accountant,(7):53-60.(in Chinese)
• 王文姣，傅超，傅代国.2017.并购商誉是否为股价崩盘的事前信号?——基于会计功能和金融安全视角[J].财经研究，43(9):76-87.Wang W J,Fu C,Fu D G.2017.Is M&A goodwill the prior signal of stock price crash risk?From the perspectives of accounting function and financial security[J].Journal of Finance and Economics,43(9):76-87.(in Chinese)
• 王小鲁，樊纲，余静文.2017.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社.Wang X L,Fan G,Yu J W.2017.Marketization index of China's provinces:NERI report 2016[M].Beijing:Social Sciences Academic Press.(in Chinese)
• 魏志华，朱彩云.2019.超额商誉是否成为企业经营负担——基于产品市场竞争能力视角的解释[J].中国工业经济，(11):174-192.Wei Z H,Zhu C Y.2019.Does excess goodwill become the burden of corporate operation—Explanation from the perspective of product market competitiveness[J].China Industrial Economics,(11):174-192.(in Chinese)
• 谢申祥，王晖.2021.固定资产加速折旧政策的就业效应[J].经济学动态，(10):100-115.Xie S X,Wang H.2021.The effects of the accelerated depreciation policy of fixed assets on employment[J].Economic Perspectives,(10):100-115.(in Chinese)
• 邢斐，周泰云，李根丽.2021.机构交叉持股能抑制企业避税吗?[J].经济管理，43(5):125-141.Xing F,Zhou T Y,Li G L.2021.Can institutional cross blockholding inhibit corporate tax avoidance?[J].Business and Management Journal,43(5):125-141.(in Chinese)
• 许罡.2020.企业社会责任履行抑制商誉泡沫吗?[J].审计与经济研究，35(1):90-99.Xu G.2020.Can corporate social responsibility inhibit goodwill bubbles?[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,35(1):90-99.(in Chinese)
• 杨威，宋敏，冯科.2018.并购商誉、投资者过度反应与股价泡沫及崩盘[J].中国工业经济，(6):156-173.Yang W,Song M,Feng K.2018.M&A goodwill,investor overreaction,and stock price bubbles and crashes[J].China Industrial Economics,(6):156-173.(in Chinese)
• 张新民，卿琛，杨道广.2018.内部控制与商誉泡沫的抑制——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),(3):55-65.Zhang X M,Qing C,Yang D G.2018.Internal control and curb of abnormal goodwill:Empirical evidence from Chinese listed firm[J].Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences),(3):55-65.(in Chinese)
• 郑海英，刘正阳，冯卫东.2014.并购商誉能提升公司业绩吗?——来自A股上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究，(3):11-17.Zheng H Y,Liu Z Y,Feng W D.2014.Can merger and acquisition goodwill promote company performance?—Empirical evidence from Chinese A-shares listed companies[J].Accounting Research,(3):11-17.(in Chinese)
• Azar J,Schmalz M C,Tecu I.2018.Anticompetitive effects of common ownership[J].The Journal of Finance,73(4):1513-1565.
• Bens D A,Heltzer W,Segal B.2011.The information content of goodwill impairments and SFAS 142[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing & Finance,26(3):527-555.
• Brooks C,Chen Z,Zeng Y Q.2018.Institutional cross-ownership and corporate strategy:The case of mergers and acquisitions[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,48:187-216.
• Chang E C,Lin T C,Ma X R.2019.Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,68(1):101223.
• Chen Y Y,Li Q Y,Ng J,et al.2021.Corporate financing of investment opportunities in a world of institutional cross-ownership[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,69:102041.
• Edmans A,Levit D,Reilly D.2019.Governance under common ownership[J].The Review of Financial Studies,32(7):2673-2719.
• Gao K J,Shen H X,Gao X,et al.2019.The power of sharing:Evidence from institutional investor cross-ownership and corporate innovation[J].International Review of Economics & Finance,63:284-296.
• Glaum M,Landsman W R,Wyrwa S.2018.Goodwill impairment:The effects of public enforcement and monitoring by institutional investors[J].The Accounting Review,93(6):149-180.
• Grinstein Y,Hribar P.2004.CEO compensation and incentives:Evidence from M&A bonuses[J].Journal of Financial Economics,73(1):119-143.
• He J,Huang J K.2017.Product market competition in a world of cross-ownership:Evidence from institutional blockholdings[J].The Review of Financial Studies,30(8):2674-2718.
• He J,Huang J K,Zhao S.2019.Internalizing governance externalities:The role of institutional cross-ownership[J].Journal of Financial Economics,134(2):400-418.
• Henning S L,Lewis B L,Shaw W H.2000.Valuation of the components of purchased goodwill[J].Journal of Accounting Research,38(2):375-386.
• Johnson L T,Petrone K R.1998.Commentary:Is goodwill an asset[J].Accounting Horizons,12(3):293-303.
• Kang J K,Luo J,Na H S.2018.Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,128(3):576-602.
• Kennedy P,O'Brien D P,Song M,et al.2017.The competitive effects of common ownership:Economic foundations and empirical evidence[R].
• Li K K,Sloan R G.2017.Has goodwill accounting gone bad?[J].Review of Accounting Studies,22(2):964-1003.
• Li Z N,Shroff P K,Venkataraman R,et al.2011.Causes and consequences of goodwill impairment losses[J].Review of Accounting Studies,16(4):745-778.
• Malmendier U,Tate G,Yan J.2011.Overconfidence and early-life experiences:The effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies[J].The Journal of Finance,66(5):1687-1733.
• Mueller D C,Sirower M L.2003.The causes of mergers:Tests based on the gains to acquiring firms' shareholders and the size of premia[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,24(5):373-391.
• Park J,Sani J,Shroff N,et al.2019.Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,67(2/3):387-415.
• Ramalingegowda S,Utke S,Yu Y.2021.Common institutional ownership and earnings management[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,38(1):208-241.
• Ramanna K.2008.The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting:Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,45(2/3):253-281.
• Ramanna K,Watts R L.2012.Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required goodwill impairment[J].Review of Accounting Studies,17(4):749-780.
• Shi W,Hoskisson R E,Zhang Y A.2017.Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness:Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?[J].Strategic Management Journal,38(3):780-792.
• Shroff N,Verdi R S,Yost B P.2017.When does the peer information environment matter?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,64(2/3):183-214.
• (1)GCross1和FCross1分别表示一般法人类机构投资者与金融类机构投资者交叉持股的哑变量,GCross2和FCross2分别表示一般法人类机构投资者与金融类机构投资者交叉持股的企业数量,GCross3和FCross3分别表示一般法人类机构投资者与金融类机构投资者交叉持股联结程度。