麦木蓉,魏安平,钟子康

• 1:北京大学光华管理学院
• 2:中山大学国际金融学院
• 3:中信建投证券股份有限公司投资银行部

摘要(Abstract)：

股票市场的波动挑动着众多的非专业投资者敏感的神经,过度的波动会打击投资者的信心,股价崩盘风险更是悬在投资者心上的一把利刃。家族企业在上市公司中的比重日益增长,与众不同的控制权安排是否带来更高/更低的股价崩盘风险?基于此,本文利用2008年至2017年中国A股非金融上市公司作为研究样本进行分析,结果表明,与非家族企业相比,创始人家族对上市公司进行控制并不是一种有效的控制权安排,家族参与治理程度越高,股价崩盘风险越高。具体表现为,家族大股东对其他中小股东的侵害加剧了股价崩盘风险;进一步发现,在股权制衡水平较低和信息披露质量较低的上市公司中,该效应更加显著。本文的结论在考虑了可能的内生性问题和稳健性检验后依然稳健。本文丰富了家族企业对股价崩盘风险的探讨,对于加强监管、强化信息披露、防范股价崩盘风险有着重要的实践意义。

关键词(KeyWords)： 家族企业;股价崩盘风险;大股东侵害

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 麦木蓉,魏安平,钟子康

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20201202.002

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• (1)长生生物科技股份有限公司于2019年11月27日正式被深圳证券交易所决定终止上市,但是公司于2018年三季度开始未披露定期报告。故本文依据公司2017年年度报告分析其股权结构和公司治理情况。
• (2)该文献将家族企业定义为创始家族成员持续担任高级管理层职务、董事会成员或为上市公司大股东,该定义与本文类似。
• (3)在本文研究样本中,家族企业上市公司的两权分离度平均值为12.65%,非家族企业上市公司的两权分离度平均值为5.84%;而家族企业上市公司的现金流权为38.13%,非家族企业上市公司的现金流权为33.16%。同时,还发现家族企业上市公司第一大股东持股比例为34.61%,非家族企业上市公司的第一大股东持股比例为36.25%,说明创始人家族可能采用了复杂的股权结构巩固自身控制权。
• (4)樊纲、王小鲁等作者报告的各省份地区市场化指数报告隔年出版,2018年版本为最新版本的市场化指数报告。