姜树广,张正平

• 1:山东大学经济研究院

摘要(Abstract)：

个体间或国家间的合作往往受到第三方干预的影响。其中，观点的共识对于合作达成以及第三方介入至关重要。本研究在基于和平制造者博弈的框架下，引入了基于观点的分组，以探究共识对合作的影响。研究发现，在不同实验局及不同对手情境下，参与者的行为存在显著差异，这与理性经济人假设下的预测不符。进一步的分析表明，共识的形成主要通过产生共同的群体身份，影响个体与他人的社会亲近程度，从而影响个体的合作行为和第三方的干预行为。此外，通过增加共同的群体身份，当事方的合作行为得到促进，同时第三方的干预也得到增加，从而提高了整体社会效率。

关键词(KeyWords)： 共识;合作;第三方干预;和平制造者博弈;社会亲近程度

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社科基金一般项目“合作与冲突:基于演化博弈与实验经济学的研究”(21BJL126)的资助

作者(Author): 姜树广,张正平

参考文献(References)：

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• (1)在实验研究中,这一概念主要包括被试随机分为无重叠的组、被试之间无互动、分组是匿名等方面(Tajfel and Turner,1986)。 (2)更多有关群体身份与合作的文章,可参见Charness and Chen(2020)关于群体身份的综述。 (3)“观点分歧”实验局中的54名被试在讨论结束后,观点倾向于支持不戴口罩与支持戴口罩的人数分别为26人与28人。 (4)被试在所有场景的和平制造者博弈实验结束后,还进行了如下的2/3选美博弈:每名被试需要独立地选择一个0至100之间的整数,最接近全部被试所选数字平均数2/3的参与者将获得300实验币的奖励。所选数字≤33的被试具有策略性思考能力。 (5)由于被解释变量涉及2个场景,对应于2个不同的轮次,因此对顺序效应的控制不适用。事实上,我们通过随机顺序、策略方法等实验技术,已经消减了每一场景出现的顺序位置对被试行为的影响。