财务顾问声誉与并购问询函的溢出效应Reputation of Financial Advisors and Spillover Effect of M&As Supervisory Inquiry
洪祥骏,何平
摘要(Abstract)：
本文利用沪深交易所对并购活动监管问询的独特场景，探讨了财务顾问过往服务的并购交易收到问询函后的监管溢出效应，分析是否造成财务顾问声誉受损，从而影响其新参与并购的绩效。结果显示，财务顾问过去参与的并购如果受到交易所问询，声誉将会受到负面影响，进而降低未来参与并购的绩效。当企业主动雇佣财务顾问时，企业更重视财务顾问声誉，声誉受损对绩效负面影响会更大；而当企业为满足监管要求被强制要求聘用财务顾问时则影响较小。此外，市场关注度更高时，并购问询的监管溢出效应会更强。在异质性检验中，跨行业并购、买卖价差较大和分析师停止追踪等信息不对称加强的情况下，问询函的监管溢出效应更强。结果表明企业雇佣财务顾问的主动性和市场关注程度显著影响了并购中财务顾问声誉发挥的作用，交易所并购问询能够通过影响财务顾问声誉以对并购中介进行监管，实现“防范化解重大风险”目标。
关键词(KeyWords)： 问询函;财务顾问;声誉机制;并购;金融监管
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金青年项目(基金号:72303196);; 福建省社科基金青年项目(基金号:FJ2022C037);福建省社科基金青年项目(基金号:FJ2021C075)的资助
作者(Author): 洪祥骏,何平
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- (1)数据来源:上海证券交易所和深交所主板监管问询、深交所中小板监管问询,以及深交所创业板监管问询等公告。
- (2)强制要求雇佣财务顾问的情况包括:标的企业为上市公司、并购交易构成重大资产重组、并购交易构成要约收购。本文定义强制要求雇佣类型以外的并购即为主动雇佣财务顾问的情况。
- (3)在主回归结果中,AfterCL 的定义为:该次并购所雇佣的财务顾问收到了关于之前参与的并购问询函则定义为1,否则为0。在安慰剂检验里面,收到问询函之前的t年作为虚构事件的解释:该并购的财务顾问在实际收到问询函的前t年至本次交易,虽然期间并没有收到问询函,但是将AfterCL定义为1,而对于实际收到问询函之后的样本则剔除。比如t=2013表明,2013年某财务顾问收到问询函,我们就分别考虑将2010年(前t-3年)作为虚拟的事件发生日,在2010年到2012年AfterCL定义为1。而在2010年以前AfterCL仍为0,同时将2013年及以后的样本剔除。
- (4)市场因子对应于市值风险,是指公司规模影响股票的风险:资产规模小,风险相应增加。
- (5)账面市值比因子对应于市场造成的财务困境风险,说明市场对公司的估值比自己账面价值要低。这些公司一般是销售状况或盈利能力不好的公司,因此相对于低B/M的公司来说需要更高的收益来补偿。