车牌拍卖中的“伏击”报价现象分析The Sniping Bidding in the Car Plates Auction
聂海峰
摘要(Abstract)：
在广州和其他城市的车牌竞价拍卖中,竞价阶段会定时公布当前平均报价,使得车牌拍卖成了有限信息公开的密封报价拍卖。由于竞价参与者之间的利益是竞争的,理性竞价人都有动机误导其他参与人报告低价,竞价阶段公布的平均报价缺乏有价值的信息。有经验的参与人会在竞价最后阶段"伏击"报价,提交有效报价。实际拍卖的数据表明竞价阶段的当前平均报价大部分情形小于最低成交价。
关键词(KeyWords)： 车牌拍卖;伏击报价;非对称信息
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): 聂海峰
DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2019.02.004
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- (1)来源:2012年09月05日06:58新快报,http://gd.qq.com/a/20120905/000008.htm,检索日期:2018年8月17日。
- (1)来源:http://www.gzqcjj.com/article/guide/201209/20120900000491.shtml.[2018-08-17]。天津、杭州和深圳的竞价拍卖规则和广州的规则类似。
- (1)来源:http://jtzl.gzjt.gov.cn/index/gbl/201879/1531121317825_1.html,检索日期:2018年8月17日。
- (1)感谢审稿人的建议。
- (1)感谢审稿人指出这一点。