胡光旗,踪家峰

• 1:南开大学经济学院
• 2:南京大学长江产业经济研究院

摘要(Abstract)：

中国存在环境锦标赛吗?本文利用2004—2018年277个地级市的面板数据进行实证研究发现：第一，城市空气质量更快的改善会显著提高市长的晋升概率，存在环境锦标赛；第二，GDP锦标赛仍对市长晋升有明显作用，环境锦标赛与GDP锦标赛两者并存，环境锦标赛并没有代替GDP锦标赛；第三，2013年以来，环境锦标赛对市长晋升的激励作用增强，并且在行政力量更强的城市，环境锦标赛对市长晋升的激励作用更大。基于上述研究，本文认为中国实行的环境锦标赛是中国环境质量提升的重要机制，未来应进一步推动官员政绩考核转型，优化环境锦标赛的相关制度设计，不断推进地方政府环境治理效能提升。

关键词(KeyWords)： 环境锦标赛;晋升锦标赛;相对绩效考核

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 科技部国家重点研发计划“大气污染成因与控制技术研究重点专项”(批准号:2018YFC0213600)的资助

作者(Author): 胡光旗,踪家峰

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20220215.001

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• (1)需要说明的是,对于晋升锦标赛这一概念的运用似乎应当格外小心。例如Maskin et al.(2000)就非常谨慎地认为中国省级政府之间存在基于经济增长业绩的“yardstick competition”(标尺竞争);杨其静和郑楠(2013)指出地方官员的晋升制度不可能是基于GDP增长率排名的锦标赛,而应当是资格赛。
• (2)2015年,中央全面深化改革领导小组第十四次会议提出环境保护“党政同责”和“一岗双责”的要求,意在提升地方党委的环保履责力度,但本文在基准回归中仍以市长而非市委书记作为切入点,主要原因在于市委书记与市长的分工差异。在组织考核时,经济增长和环境保护等方面的绩效与市长晋升的关系更加密切,故以市长为视角入手进行分析更有利于探究环境锦标赛对于官员晋升的影响。在后续的进一步分析中,本文还将探讨环境锦标赛对市长及市委书记晋升影响的异质性。