流量分配机制与平台内双重市场竞争——以电商平台为例Traffic Allocation Mechanism and Dual Market Competition within the Platform:Taking E-commerce Platforms as an Example
曲创,钟兴达,刘翰臻
摘要(Abstract)：
本文区分了平台内部的流量市场与商品市场，通过构建商家竞争模型比较了低价扶持和完全竞价两种平台流量分配机制下商家的流量竞争和产品价格竞争行为以及福利。研究发现，与完全竞价机制相比，流量低价扶持机制会造成竞价流量的稀缺，从而推高商家流量成本和商品价格；会缩小商家间的利润差距，使低质量商品难以被市场淘汰；平台流量分配机制的选择与商品差异和天真消费者数量相关；当消费者质量偏好的平均水平提高时，流量低价扶持机制会导致商品质量价格匹配效率下降，最终损害消费者剩余和社会总福利。本文将平台流量分配机制和商家在平台内流量市场和商品市场的双重竞争纳入统一的分析框架，为规范平台流量分配机制、保障平台内市场的公平竞争、引导平台经济实现互利共赢的高质量发展目标提供了理论依据。
关键词(KeyWords)： 平台流量分配机制;平台内双重市场竞争;电商平台
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重大项目“数字化变革、中国流通渠道创新和经济增长模式转变研究”(项目编号:20&ZD054)的资助
作者(Author): 曲创,钟兴达,刘翰臻
参考文献(References)：
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- (1)详见欧盟委员会的亚马逊黄金购物车案(Case AT.40703)和美国贸易委员会诉亚马逊案(Case 2:23-cv-01495)。 (2)该财报中注明客户管理服务主要为“按点击次数、千次展示等计费的营销服务”,即付费流量服务。 (3)淘宝百科:《淘宝直通车如何收费?了解淘宝直通车的收费标准》,https://bk.taobao.com/k/taobao_6/7db287cfe32d6e3c9a5c361640106373.html。 (4)消费者报道:《〈2025放心消费报告〉发布:高质价比得人心,都不再迷信明星推荐》,https://www.ccreports.com.cn/rihua/45087。 (5)本文不同流量分配机制下的均衡结果用上标来区分,流量完全竞价机制下的均衡结果用上标“*”表示,流量低价扶持机制下的均衡结果用上标“**”表示。 (6)图中取λ=0.2,w=0.01,m=0.6,δ=0.9,左图中取θH=1,右图中取θL=0.3。λ与w较大时,商家生产成本和佣金成本过高,难以经营且不符合现实。当δ取值较小时,图像与之相似,δ的大小并不影响结论。 (7)图中取λ=0.2,w=0.01,θH=1,θL=0.6,m=0.6,δ=0.9。 (8)图中取λ=0.2,w=0.01,θH=1,θL=0.6,m=0.6,δ=0.9。