王永进,燕晓娟

• 1:南开大学经济学院

摘要(Abstract)：

官员交流是具有中国特色的官员治理制度，在促进地区经济发展和提升官员治理水平上卓有成就，成为一种引人注目的现象。本文基于2007—2013年间关长交流的自然实验，利用倍差法考察关长交流对关长流出地企业出口的影响。研究发现，关长交流会显著促进关长流出地的企业出口，并且这种影响只在关长流入地是出口较多的地区时发挥作用；这种影响也会因企业出口形式、关长能力和任期的不同而存在差异；关长交流的作用会在关长交流当期就发挥作用，但随着关长交流年份的延长，这种作用逐年下降，并在关长交流后的第三年消失；关长交流的作用仅通过影响流出地出口企业目的国范围来影响企业出口数量。

关键词(KeyWords)： 关长交流;企业出口;关长流出地

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“竞争中性原则与中国对外贸易利益：理论机制、实证检验与量化分析（项目号：72073073）”

作者(Author): 王永进,燕晓娟

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20220915.001

参考文献(References)：

• 陈刚，李树.2012.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济，35(2):120-142.Chen G,Li S.2012.Official exchange,tenure and anti-corruption[J].The Journal of World Economy,35(2):120-142.(in Chinese)
• 陈绍俭，冯宗宪，殷永昆.2019.官员来源、本地信息与地区经济增长——基于地级市数据的新证据[J].南方经济，(1):120-136.Chen S J,Feng Z X,Yin Y K.2019.Leader sources,local information and regional economic growth:New evidence from city-level data[J].South China Journal of Economics,(1):120-136.(in Chinese)
• 戴美虹，刘海洋，林令涛.2021.制度还是技术影响中国的出口活力：以国有企业为例[J].世界经济，44(3):110-134.Dai M H,Liu H Y,Lin L T.2021.Institution or technology?The driving force of vitality of China's export[J].The Journal of World Economy,44(3):110-134.(in Chinese)
• 董志强，周敏丹，魏下海.2012.地市级官员交流与地方经济发展——基于广东省(1988—2009)的经验研究[J].南方经济，(10):32-42.Dong Z Q,Zhou M D,Wei X H.2012.Prefectural-level official exchanges and local economic development:An empirical study based on Guangdong (1988—2009)[J].South China Journal of Economics,(10):32-42.(in Chinese)
• 范子英，李欣.2014.部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配[J].经济研究，49(6):129-141.Fan Z Y,Li X.2014.Political connection of ministers and the allocation of fiscal transfer[J].Economic Research Journal,49(6):129-141.(in Chinese)
• 范子英，彭飞，刘冲.2016.政治关联与经济增长——基于卫星灯光数据的研究[J].经济研究，51(1):114-126.Fan Z Y,Peng F,Liu C.2016.Political connections and economic growth:Evidence from the DMSP/OLS satellite data[J].Economic Research Journal,51(1):114-126.(in Chinese)
• 黄玖立，李坤望.2013.吃喝、腐败与企业订单[J].经济研究，48(6):71-84.Huang J L,Li K W.2013.Eat-drink,corruption and firm's purchase order[J].Economic Research Journal,48(6):71-84.(in Chinese)
• 黄顺武，刘海洋，李婷.2017.地方政府官员能否提振本地企业出口——来自中国地级市市长和市委书记的证据[J].国际贸易问题，(8):40-50.Huang S W,Liu H Y,Li T.2017.Politicians and firm export—Evidence from China's prefectural officials[J].Journal of International Trade,(8):40-50.(in Chinese)
• 李江涛，严文龙，曾铁兵.2015.政治关联、制度环境与会计师事务所经营业绩[J].审计与经济研究，30(5):32-43.Li J T,Yan W L,Zeng T B.2015.Political association,institutional environment and the accounting firm operating performance[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,30(5):32-43.(in Chinese)
• 李书娟，徐现祥，戴天仕.2016.身份认同与夜间灯光亮度[J].世界经济，39(8):169-192.Li S J,Xu X X,Dai T S.2016.Identity and luminosity[J].The Journal of World Economy,39(8):169-192.(in Chinese)
• 李书娟，徐现祥.2016.身份认同与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),15(3):941-962.Li S J,Xu X X.2016.Identity and growth[J].China Economic Quarterly,15(3):941-962.(in Chinese)
• 梁平汉，高楠.2014.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界，(6):65-78.Liang P H,Gao N.2014.Personnel change,legal environment and local environmental pollution[J].Management World,(6):65-78.(in Chinese)
• 梁漱溟.1949.中国文化要义[M].上海：上海人民出版社.Liang S M.1949.Essen of Chinese culture[M].Shanghai:Shanghai People's Publishing House.(in Chinese)
• 林毅夫，蔡昉，李周.1999.比较优势与发展战略——对“东亚奇迹”的再解释[J].中国社会科学，(5):4-20.Lin Y F,Cai F,Li Z.1999.Comparative advantage and development strategy[J].Social Sciences in China,(5):4-20.(in Chinese)
• 刘斌，王杰.2016.地方官员腐败与企业出口模式——基于中国事实的经验研究[J].经济学报，3(4):62-84.Liu B,Wang J.2016.Corruption of local officials and enterprise export mode—Empirical study based on the Chinese facts[J].China Journal of Economics,3(4):62-84.(in Chinese)
• 刘玉海，赵鹏.2018.地方官员治理与城市绿色增长[J].经济学报，5(4):45-78.Liu Y H,Zhao P.2018.The impact of local official governance on urban green growth[J].China Journal of Economics,5(4):45-78.(in Chinese)
• 吕朝凤，陈霄.2015.地方官员会影响FDI的区位选择吗——基于倍差法的实证研究[J].国际贸易问题，(5):115-123.Lyu C F,Chen X.2015.Local officials and regional FDI:An empirical study based on difference-in-difference estimation[J].Journal of International Trade,(5):115-123.(in Chinese)
• 盛丹，王永进.2010.地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构[J].金融研究，(11):1-18.Sheng D,Wang Y J.2010.Local governments' cyclical fiscal expenditure and revenue,financial dependence and regional export structure[J].Journal of Financial Research,(11):1-18.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，徐现祥.2008.地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据[J].管理世界，(3):16-26.Wang X B,Xu X X.2008.Source,destination,tenure and economic growth of local officials:Evidence from the governor and Secretary of the provincial Party committee of China[J].Management World,(3):16-26.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，徐现祥.2014.官员能力与经济发展——来自省级官员个体效应的证据[J].南方经济，(6):1-24.Wang X B,Xu X X.2014.Local leader competence and development performance[J].South China Journal of Economics,(6):1-24.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，徐现祥.2017.官员交流驱动外商投资[J].中国经济问题，(3):88-100.Wang X B,Xu X X.2017.Official rotation and foreign investment[J].China Economic Studies,(3):88-100.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，黄亮雄.2020.官员交流与经济发展——中国情景研究的回顾与展望[J].产业经济评论，(6):70-85.Wang X B,Huang L X.2020.Official rotation and economic development:Review and outlook on economic studies in China[J].Review of Industrial Economics,(6):70-85.(in Chinese)
• 王永进，黄青.2018.司法效率、契约密集度与出口绩效：来自高院院长异地交流的证据[J].经济学报，5(4):177-207.Wang Y J,Huang Q.2018.Judicial efficiency,contract intensity and export performance:A quasi-experiment from China's geographical rotation of judges[J].China Journal of Economics,5(4):177-207.(in Chinese)
• 吴文锋，吴冲锋，芮萌.2009.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界，(3):134-142.Wu W F,Wu C F,Rui M.2009.Between the special connections that high-ranking managers of some of China's listed companies have with the government and tax preference afforded to them[J].Management World,(3):134-142.(in Chinese)
• 徐现祥，王贤彬，舒元.2007.地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究，42(9):18-31.Xu X X,Wang X B,Shu Y.2007.Local officials and economic growth[J].Economic Research Journal,42(9):18-31.(in Chinese)
• 徐现祥，王贤彬.2010.晋升激励与经济增长：来自中国省级官员的证据[J].世界经济，33(2):15-36.Xu X X,Wang X B.2010.Political incentive and economic growth:Evidence from China[J].The Journal of World Economy,33(2):15-36.(in Chinese)
• 徐现祥，李书娟.2019.官员偏爱籍贯地的机制研究——基于资源转移的视角[J].经济研究，54(7):111-126.Xu X X,Li S J.2019.A study of the mechanism of leaders' regional favoritism—Based on the resource reallocation perspective[J].Economic Research Journal,54(7):111-126.(in Chinese)
• 杨海生，罗党论，陈少凌.2010.资源禀赋、官员交流与经济增长[J].管理世界，(5):17-26.Yang H S,Luo D L,Chen S L.2010.The resources endowment,the interchange of officials' positions,and the economic growth[J].Management World,(5):17-26.(in Chinese)
• 杨其静，郑楠.2013.地方领导晋升竞争是标尺赛、锦标赛还是资格赛[J].世界经济，36(12):130-156.Yang Q J,Zheng N.2013.Is the competition for promotion of local leaders a scale competition,championship or qualification competition[J].The Journal of World Economy,36(12):130-156.(in Chinese)
• 杨瑞龙，王元，聂辉华.2013.“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界，(3):23-33.Yang R L,Wang Y,Nie H H.2013.The promotion mechanism of “quasi-officers”:Evidence from China's central enterprises[J].Management World,(3):23-33.(in Chinese)
• 姚洋，张牧扬.2013.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛——来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究，48(1):137-150.Yao Y,Zhang M Y.2013.Performance of officials and the promotion tournament—Evidence from Chinese cities[J].Economic Research Journal,48(1):137-150.(in Chinese)
• 张杰，刘志彪，张少军.2008.制度扭曲与中国本土企业的出口扩张[J].世界经济，(10):3-11.Zhang J,Liu Z B,Zhang S J.2008.Institutional distortion and export expansion of Chinese local enterprises[J].The Journal of World Economy,(10):3-11.(in Chinese)
• 张军，高远.2007.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究，(11):91-103.Zhang J,Gao Y.2007.Term limits and rotation of Chinese governors:Do they matter to economic growth?[J].Economic Research Journal,(11):91-103.(in Chinese)
• 张平，赵国昌，罗知.2012.中央官员来源与地方经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),11(2):613-634.Zhang P,Zhao G C,Luo Z.2012.Sources of central officials and local economic growth[J].China Economic Quarterly,11(2):613-634.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2004.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究，39(6):33-40.Zhou L A.2004.The incentive and cooperation of government officials in the political tournaments:An interpretation of the prolonged local protectionism and duplicative investments in China[J].Economic Research Journal,39(6):33-40.(in Chinese)
• Alesina A,?zler S,Roubini N,et al.1996.Political instability and economic growth[J].Journal of Economic Growth,1(2):189-211.
• Baldwin R.2005.Heterogeneous firms and trade:Testable and untestable properties of the Melitz model[R].NBER Working Papers 5663.
• Besley T,Montalvo J G,Reynal-Querol M.2011.Do educated leaders matter?[J].The Economic Journal,121(554):F205-F227.
• Boubakri N,Cosset J C,Saffar W.2008.Political connections of newly privatized firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5):654-673.
• Cao C F,Dong Y Z,Hou W X,et al.2019.Provincial official turnover and bank loans[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,57:101202.
• ?olak G,Durnev A,Qian Y M.2017.Political uncertainty and IPO activity:Evidence from U.S.gubernatorial elections[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,52(6):2523-2564.
• Deng Y P,Wu Y R,Xu H L.2019.Political turnover and firm pollution discharges:An empirical study[J].China Economic Review,58:101363.
• Dreher A,Lamla M J,Lein S M,et al.2009.The impact of political leaders' profession and education on reforms[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,37(1):169-193.
• Earle J S,Gehlbach S.2015.The productivity consequences of political turnover:Firm-level evidence from Ukraine's orange revolution[J].American Journal of Political Science,59(3):708-723.
• Fisman R.2001.Estimating the value of political connections[J].American Economic Review,91(4):1095-1102.
• Gao P J,Murphy D,Qi Y X.(2019-02-09).Political uncertainty and public financing costs:Evidence from U.S.gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets[EB/OL].https://ssrn.com/abstract=1992200.
• Hassan M.2017.The strategic shuffle:Ethnic geography,the internal security apparatus,and elections in Kenya[J].American Journal of Political Science,61(2):382-395.
• Hodler R,Raschky P A.2014.Regional favoritism[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,129(2):995-1033.
• Jacobson L S,LaLonde R J,Sullivan D G.1993.Earnings losses of displaced workers[J].The American Economic Review,83(4):685-709.
• Jens C E.2017.Political uncertainty and investment:Causal evidence from U.S.gubernatorial elections[J].Journal of Financial Economics,124(3):563-579.
• Jiang J Y,Mei Y.2020.Mandarins make markets:Leadership rotations and inter-provincial trade in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,147:102524.
• Jones B F,Olken B A.2005.Do leaders matter?National leadership and growth since World War Ⅱ[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,120(3):835-864.
• Julio B,Yook Y.2012.Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles[J].The Journal of Finance,67(1):45-83.
• Krugman P R.1980.Scale economies,product differentiation,and the pattern of trade[J].American Economic Review,70(5):950-959.
• Levchenko A A.2007.Institutional quality and international trade[J].The Review of Economic Studies,74(3):791-819.
• Li H B,Zhou L A.2005.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,89(9/10):1743-1762.
• Luo W J,Zhang X M.2022.Political turnover and corporate research and development:Evidence from China[J].Applied Economics Letters,29(7):573-578.
• Melitz M J.2003.The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity[J].Econometrica,71(6):1695-1725.
• Olney W W.2016.Impact of corruption on firm-level export decisions[J].Economic Inquiry,54(2):1105-1127.
• Persson P,Zhuravskaya E.2016.The limits of career concerns in federalism:Evidence from China[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,14(2):338-374.
• Rochlitz M,Kulpina V,Remington T,et al.2015.Performance incentives and economic growth:Regional officials in Russia and China[J].Eurasian Geography and Economics,56(4):421-445.
• Song M.2014.Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics[C].2014 Meeting Papers 1145,Society for Economic Dynamics.
• Vahlne J E,Johanson J.2017.From internationalization to evolution:The Uppsala model at 40 years[J].Journal of International Business Studies,48(9):1087-1102.
• Zhao D X.2015.The confucian-legalist state:A new theory of Chinese history[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Zhong W G,Lin Y,Gao D X,et al.2019.Does politician turnover affect foreign subsidiary performance?Evidence in China[J].Journal of International Business Studies,50(7):1184-1212.
• (1)1962年中国共产党第八届中央委员会第十次全体会议通过了《中共中央关于有计划有步骤地交流各级党政主要领导干部的决定》;1990年中共中央做出了《中共中央关于实行党和国家机关领导干部交流制度的决定》;1999年中共中央发布了《党政领导干部交流工作暂行规定》;2006年8月中共中央正式发布《党政领导干部交流工作规定》。
• (2)南昌海关发生过两次关长交流:2009年李多宽调任南京海关关长;2012年薛金楼调任乌鲁木齐海关关长。李国2008年从沈阳海关调任福州海关关长,2012年调任乌鲁木齐海关关长。
• (3)发生关长交流的海关中有11个海关的关长调任至出口更多的海关:福州海关、贵阳海关、哈尔滨海关、昆明海关、满洲里海关、南昌海关、青岛海关、深圳海关、沈阳海关、太原海关、天津海关。