周晔馨,何娟,梁斌,涂勤

• 1:北京师范大学创新发展研究中心(珠海)、经济与资源管理研究院
• 2:北京师范大学经济与资源管理研究院
• 3:内蒙古大学经济管理学院
• 4:北京师范大学创新发展研究中心(珠海)

摘要(Abstract)：

本文利用较大规模的标准实验和工人田野实验,研究了合作类型的个体及人群异质性,以及社会资本对合作类型的影响。实验发现,虽然条件合作具有普遍性,但在学生样本中搭便车型的比例显著更高,而在工人被试中高度合作型的比例更大。采用mlogit模型进一步分析发现,社会资本的一般信任和社会网络维度对合作类型分布的影响在学生和工人群体间具有异质性。高信任使得工人更可能成为一个搭便车者或高度合作者,而非条件合作者,紧密社会网络使得工人更可能成为一个高度合作者,但两者对学生整体合作偏好的影响不显著。本文为基于人群异质性的政策制定和通过一般信任与社会网络来助推社会合作提供了行为实验证据。

关键词(KeyWords)： 异质性;合作;合作类型;社会资本;田野实验

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目（71773010）;国家自然科学基金地区项目（71563035）;; 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（SKZZY2014028、SKXJS2014007）资助的成果

作者(Author): 周晔馨,何娟,梁斌,涂勤

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2019.03.004

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• (1)2005年Science在其创刊125周年之际将其列为25个重大科学谜题之一(Pennisi,2005)。
• (1)Becker(1976)在《The Economic Approach to Human Behavior》一书中写到：“The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior,market equilibrium,and stable preferences,used relentlessly and unflinchingly,form the heart of the economic approach as I see it．”
• (1)原文为“The fewer friends I have the more strongly my fate is bound to theirs”。
• (2)本地、随机和“小世界”三种社会网络结构的划分依据节点之间的平均路径和集聚系数，本地网络具有高聚集的特征，随机网络具有小的平均路径的特征，“小世界”则同时具有较小的平均路径和较高的聚集系数的特征：大多数节点不是彼此的邻居，但任何给定节点的邻居都可能是彼此的邻居，大多数节点可以通过少量的跳数或步骤从其他节点到达。生活中所处的环境大多具有“小世界”的特征。
• (1)第二阶段的惩罚机制规定，向公共账户贡献点数低于10的被试将被处以2单位筹码的罚款(si)。在这种情况下，支付函数为πi=10-gi+0.5∑3j=1gj-si。具体实施中又区分了外生惩罚和内生惩罚制度，即组内成员是否通过民主投票的方式来决定是否实施惩罚。实验回合包括：(1)无惩罚制度(ExoNoLaw);(2)外生惩罚制度(ExoLaw);(3)内生惩罚制度(Endo)。
• (2)Kocher的标准中，条件合作者的贡献水平是组内其他人平均贡献水平的单调增函数。
• (3)驼峰型也称为倒U型合作者(周业安等，2013)、三角型合作者(triangle contributor)(Fischbacher and Gachter,2006;Herrmann and Th9ni,2009)。
• (1)在Kurzban and Houser(2005)的研究中，在条件供给阶段保持高额贡献的被试被划分为合作者(cooperator)，保持较低贡献的被试被划分为搭便车者；在Rustagi et al.(2010)的研究中，总是贡献全部筹码的被试被定性为利他主义者(altruist)。
• (2)合并的原因在于：一是FGF标准的驼峰型中高度合作型和搭便车型较多，余下的仅有学生和工人观测值分别仅有11个、3个，不合适进行分析；二是按照一次拟合曲线，FGF标准下驼峰型的斜率也是接近0的，与“其他型”较相似。
• (1)我们还剔除了工人样本中的消极合作者，重新绘制了热力图，具体见附录。
• (1)信任可通过问卷(Gachter et al.,2004)和行为实验(Bouma et al.,2008)两种方式来测度，并且Anderson et al.(2004)和陈叶烽等(2010)的研究表明，两种方式测度的信任水平具有一致性，因而本文使用问卷调查的方式测量信任水平是合适的。
• (1)内外控倾向来源于罗特的控制点理论，是社会学和心理学中衡量个体归因倾向的指标：依据个体在多大的程度上将成功归因于自身努力而将个体划分为内控型和外控型人格(Rotter,1966)。内控型特征的个体具有强烈的自我信念，并倾向于将事情的结果归因于主观能动性；外控性特征的个体则缺乏自我信念，将行为的结果归因于运气或他人。
• (1)感谢匿名审稿人的建议和启发。
• (1)感谢匿名审稿人的建议和启发。