官僚体制中的激励机制问题Incentive Problems in Bureaucratic Institutions
许成钢
摘要(Abstract)：
本文讨论在官僚体制中,如何解决各级官僚的激励机制问题,促进社会的改革和经济的增长;在不同的司法制度下,如何解决所有的人(官僚、企业、个人)守法的激励机制问题;在不同的财政金融制度中,如何解决官僚、企业高管和企业家们与创业、投资相关的激励机制问题。对这几个方面的分析揭示的一个共同点是,在面对多项复杂任务时,官僚体制在解决激励机制问题时会遇到根本性的困难。
关键词(KeyWords)： 官僚体制;激励机制;体制改革;司法与监管;软预算约束
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): 许成钢
DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2017.02.001
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- (1 2016年12月4日在2016年中国经济学奖颁奖仪式上的获奖感言。文章中的所有谬误由作者本人负责。
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