赵丽,胡植尧

• 1:中国社会科学院大学商学院
• 2:中国社会科学院大学经济学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文使用2007到2016年官员晋升数据与276个地级市面板数据匹配，实证考察环境治理对官员晋升的影响。研究发现：环境治理促进了官员晋升；环境绩效考核和经济绩效考核并存，环境绩效在官员考核中被强化，经济绩效被弱化。从区域角度看，北方地区更强调以经济增长的方式晋升，南方地区注重以环境治理的方式晋升；相比非环境保护重点城市，环境保护重点城市的官员通过环境治理晋升的概率更高。从官员特征看，官员任期越长，环境治理对官员晋升的影响越大；使用逆温作为工具变量，并经过多种稳健性检验后，结论依然成立。本文的政策含义是，应当强化绿色发展理念和环境绩效考核的重要性、调整绩效考核比重，建立“因地制宜”的官员治理体系、建立正式制度和非正式制度相结合的治理体系，激发官员环境治理的内生动力，实现绿色高质量发展。

关键词(KeyWords)： 环境治理;官员晋升激励;经济发展水平

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 中国社会科学院大学（研究生院）研究生科研创新支持计划项目“大型平台企业数据确权研究”（2022-KY-118）的资助

作者(Author): 赵丽,胡植尧

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20230215.001

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• (1)通过计算pm2.5growth的标准差为0.369,0.369×(-0.209)=-0.0771。gdptenure的标准差为1.861,通过计算1.861×0.008=0.0149。