相对绩效考核、地方领导社会关系与地方政府行为Relative Performance, Local Leaders Social Ties, and Local Government Behavior
梁平汉,周润桦
摘要(Abstract)：
本文在相对绩效考核的模型框架内,考察地方政府内部横向权力结构对于地方政府行为的影响。结合竞赛理论和团队生产理论,本文把地方领导看作一个群体,构造了团队间竞争博弈模型。模型结果表明,团队内部成员之间存在一定的竞争可以提高成员的努力程度,解决"搭便车"问题。实验经济学的证据表明,竞赛参与者之间的社会关系会弱化竞争强度,减少努力程度。因此,使用理论模型预测地方领导之间的社会关系会弱化相对绩效考核的激励效果,从而对辖区绩效造成负面影响。本文利用1990—2014年的省委书记—省长经历信息构造了地方领导之间的社会关系,基于省级经济数据进行面板数据回归。结果发现,当省委书记和省长之间存在一定的社会关系时,辖区内的投资水平显著下降,随后几年当地的污染和腐败水平出现上升,这与理论预测是一致的。安慰剂检验、分样本检验和基于地级市的稳健性检验很大程度支持了主要实证结果。本文的研究表明,在研究国家治理体制中,需要注意部门之间关系与政府上下级关系的相互影响。要提高政府整体治理水平,需要在人事管理中增加干部来源的多样性。
关键词(KeyWords)： 社会关系;相对绩效考核;政府行为;团队理论
基金项目(Foundation): 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“创新驱动与政府角色”(16JJD630009);; 中山大学高校基本科研业务费专项资金(17wkjz13);; 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71503208)的资助
作者(Author): 梁平汉,周润桦
DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2020.01.001
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- (1)事实上,如果有多个团队,每个团队有多名成员,模型的基本结果仍然成立,只是其形式会略微复杂。
- (2)如果我们采取更一般化的成本函数形式,例如C(e)(包括线性函数形式),那么在满足一定的性质后仍然可以得到相同的结果。
- (3)可以证明,当两个团队内部的竞争强度不同,即两个团队具有不同的β时,内部竞争强度更大的团队其成员均衡努力程度更高。限于篇幅,这里没有展现这一结果。
- (4)如果采用任意其他事先规定好的分配规则,只要团队成员获得奖品的概率之和为1,则“搭便车”问题仍然无法得到解决(Holmstrom,1982)。
- (5)在本文的理论部分,我们得到的主要命题是团队内部竞争有利于努力程度和绩效水平的提高。在现实生活中,不乏党政领导者之间不团结,相互不和,互相拆台,从而严重影响决策效率的案例。本文的模型只能从过度竞争导致努力浪费的角度来近似描述这一现象。更完整的研究也许需要引入个体可能从事破坏性活动这一选项。但是,这会导致多重均衡的出现,从而严重影响到理论预测的实证检验。
- (6)在行为经济学理论看来,博弈参与者并不是完全自私自利的,而是具有一定的社会偏好,会将他人的收益按照一定的权重纳入自身的支付函数,在决策中加以考虑。而博弈参与者之间的社会认同、社会关系等可以增大对方的收益在自身支付函数中的权重(Chen and Li,2009;Goette et al.,2012)。因此,在竞争环境中,对方的损失也会进入己方的支付函数中,具有社会偏好的参与者会考虑自身行动给对方带来的影响,并进行相应的最优反应。
- (7)当然,在现实中,领导干部之间存在社会关系产生负面影响的机制不止削弱竞争这一种。如果领导干部之间存在社会关系,他们可能相互之间缺乏制衡,从而对政府行为和绩效产生负面影响。我们的理论模型并没有考虑这一点,是高度简化的、基于晋升博弈推演的模型。
- (8)文献中还经常使用共同的工作经历(Jia et al.,2015)或提拔关系(高楠和梁平汉,2015;Jiang and Zhang,2018)作为领导干部之间社会关系的度量。本文认为,这一方法比较适合度量上下级领导干部的关系,但是对于同级领导干部则不太合适。样本中省委书记和省长在任现职前基本没有同一职能部门工作经历,也没有上下级关系,主要的共事经历是一起担任同省省级领导班子成员,如省委副书记、副省长等职务时的经历。
- (9)城市化率2005—2014年数据来自国家统计局(城镇人口/总人口),1990—2000年数据来自周一星和田帅(2006)修正后的数据,2001—2004年的数据参考周一星和田帅(2006)修正得到。
- (10)采用Jia et al.(2015)的思想,我们将省委书记、省长和中央领导干部的政治关联定义为和在任中央政治局常委有过共事关系,有此关系变量取1,没有则取0。
- (11)如果省委书记或者省长就任现职之前的职位为本省的领导职位,如省长、省委副书记、副省长等,则这一变量为1,否则为0。
- (12)我们还尝试了用经济增长率等指标作为被解释变量,结果地方领导社会关系及其滞后项的影响系数均为负,但是多数不显著。
- (13)Chen and Hong (2016)的研究表明,如果不同省份的省级领导之间政治关联,那么以区域媒体的负面新闻报道为衡量指标,省际竞争反而可能增加。这体现了社会关系与政治关联之间的微妙差别和多样性影响。
- (14)http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/cjwtjd/201308/t20130829_74318.html