辛清泉

• 1:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文使用上市公司年报中披露的分笔银行贷款数据,考察了银行在股票市场公开上市如何影响了贷款契约的价格条款和非价格条款。借助商业银行公开上市时点各不相同这一背景,采用双重差分估计模型,研究发现,平均而言,银行在上市之后,贷款利率下降了10~11个基点,贷款期限缩短了大约10个百分点,要求为贷款提供抵押的比例下降了8.9%。这说明公开上市对银行的贷款业务产生了重要影响;同时,银行上市之后其贷款客户的财务困境风险要更显著更低。综合上述结果,本文认为,公开上市改变了银行对待风险和收益的激励,银行在上市之后更为强调贷款客户的风险状况,贷款业务总体更为保守。这一现象背后的原因,可能是由于回避风险的银行管理层基于职业生涯考虑的结果。

关键词(KeyWords)： 商业银行;公开上市;银行贷款

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272087);; 中央高校基本科研业务费项目(CDJSK100209)资助

作者(Author): 辛清泉

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2017.03.002

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• (1)从经济意义上看,一个可供比较的例子是Bharath et al.(2011),他们发现,关系贷款会导致10~17个利率基点的下降。
• (2)本文特别感谢中国银行一位负责贷款业务的经理,其就贷款制度和程序同本文作者进行了座谈交流。
• (3)大量的理论和经验文献指出,贷款人风险水平同贷款利率呈现正相关关系(如,Petersen and Rajan,1994;Strahan,1999),中国的经验证据可参见Qian et al.(2015)。
• (1)需要特别说明的是,给定客户风险不变,银行更为保守的贷款策略理论上应该提高贷款契约中的抵押要求,因为抵押有助于减少客户贷款之后的机会主义行为,也有助于银行在客户陷入财务困境时收回部分的贷款本金或利息(Chan and Thakor,1987;Boot et al.,1991)。但是,抵押要求本身又深受客户风险的影响,高风险的客户更可能被要求提供抵押物。而且,对于银行而言,即使高风险客户提供了抵押物,其贷款安全性可能依然要弱于低风险客户的非抵押贷款。有研究(包括本文)发现,贷款合同中存在抵押条款时,贷款利率不是更低而是更高(Berge and Udell,1990;Bharath et al.,2011)。究其原因,不是抵押条款不能缓解客户道德风险,而是因为抵押的风险缓解程度不足于消除银行对客户本身高风险的顾虑。因此,我们认为,银行上市之后贷款合同中更低的抵押条款频率应该是客户风险组合变化所致。
• (1)文献指出,伴随着公开上市,企业的股权结构被分散,容易出现经典文献所指出的经理卸责、在职消费、疏忽大意甚至直接偷盗等代理问题(Berle and Means,1932;Jensen and Meckling,1976)。比如,Edgerton(2012)发现,相比于私募基金和杠杠收购的非上市公司,美国上市公司商务飞机队列规模要显著更高,表明上市公司经理层面的在职消费问题更为严重。Asker et al.(2015)发现,美国上市公司相比于非上市公司资本投资水平更低,且投资对投资机会的敏感性更弱,表明股票市场上市导致公司的短期主义行为更为严重。Bernstein(2015)发现,与上市相联系的代理问题抑制了公司的创新激励,导致公司的创新质量有所下降。
• (1)需要指出的是,目前国内已经有学者使用上述方法收集上市公司银行贷款数据并进行研究(如,胡奕明和谢诗蕾,2005;沈红波等,2007;Bailey et al.,2011)。
• (1)Fan et al.(2012)指出,我国上市公司1991-2006年,长期借款占总借款的比例中位数不到10%。
• (1)必须承认的是,试图准确地识别公开上市作用于贷款契约背后的机理面临着艰难的挑战。原因是我们难于直接观察到银行上市如何影响了管理层对待贷款风险的态度。针对银行管理层进行访谈是一条可能的途径,但难于确保管理层会说出真话,也难于确保受访管理层的代表性。在本节中,我们仅仅是根据现有文献提出一个猜想,并结合银行IPO发行股份高低进行了初步的分组测试;然而,我们现在所做的工作并不能有效排除其他可能的解释。还有一种可能的猜想是,银行在上市后,由于面临更严格的监管要求,银行必须在贷款流程中做出更刻板、更程式化的规范和限制,比如,直接对贷款客户的规模和财务指标进行限制,由此自动筛出了一部分高风险客户。没有重点强调这一猜想的原因是考虑到将本文的发现衔接到之前学术文献的需要,另外我们也没有办法直接提供对这一猜测的有效证据。这里提醒读者,需要对本文提出的解释保持谨慎的态度。未来的研究如果能获得银行贷款内部资料的数据,应该可以解开公开上市的真正作用机理。
• (1)参见《财经》杂志2004年第22期《银监会指路风险定价》。
• (2)参见由美国政府成立的金融危机调查委员会于2011年发布的长篇调查报告《The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report》。