王芳,刘红芹,陈硕

• 1:华东师范大学公共管理学院
• 2:华东理工大学社会与公共管理学院
• 3:复旦大学经济学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文试图以官员晋升激励为视角,研究经济新常态下我国地方政府的支出效率。当前关于机构精简、三公支出及重复建设等问题逐渐成为公众关注焦点之一,同时也被政府所重视。但与基于西方国家研究相比,针对我国政府效率的研究相对薄弱。本文首先测算1996—2015年我国地市级政府支出效率;其次,检验官员晋升激励对支出效率的影响。本文发现就总体效率来说,晋升激励能够显著提高辖区财政支出效率及基建效率,但对教育支出效率的影响不显著;同时,晋升激励作用也存在异质性。本文发现从政治经济学角度增加了对我国地方政府行为的理解。

关键词(KeyWords)： 官员激励;支出效率;DEA核算

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题(项目批准号:2020BJL003);上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题“积极财政政策背景下的政府支出效率研究”(项目批准号:2018EGL020);; 国家自然科学基金面上及重点项目(项目批准号:71773021和71933002);; 上海市教育委员会科研创新计划(项目批准号2017-01-07-00-07-E00002);; 复旦大学“卓越2025”人才培育计划以及“2018、19及20年理论经济学Ⅰ类高峰计划”的资助

作者(Author): 王芳,刘红芹,陈硕

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2021.03.002

参考文献(References)：

• 陈诗一，张军.2008.中国地方政府财政支出效率研究：1978—2005[J].中国社会科学，(4):65-78,206.Chen S Y,Zhang J.2008.Efficiency of local government financial expenditure in China:1978—2005[J].Social Sciences in China,(4):65-78,206.(in Chinese)
• 代娟，甘金龙.2013.基于DEA的财政支出效率研究[J].财政研究，(8):22-25.Dai J,Gan J L.2013.Research of financial expenditure efficiency based on DEA[J].Public Finance Research,(8):22-25.(in Chinese)
• 傅勇，张晏.2007.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界，(3):4-12,22.Fu Y,Zhang Y.2007.The China-style of decentralization and fiscal expenditure composition:The cost of competition for growth[J].Management World,(3):4-12,22.(in Chinese)
• 傅勇.2010.财政分权、政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给[J].经济研究，45(8):4-15,65.Fu Y.2010.Fiscal decentralization,governance and non-economic public goods provision[J].Economic Research Journal,45(8):4-15,65.(in Chinese)
• 耿曙，庞保庆，钟灵娜.2016.中国地方领导任期与政府行为模式：官员任期的政治经济学[J].经济学(季刊),15(3):893-916.Geng S,Pang B Q,Zhong L N.2016.The political economy of the term factor in China:The term of local cadres and the behavior of local governments[J].China Economic Quarterly,15(3):893-916.(in Chinese)
• 管治华，许坤，许文立.2016.结构性减税压力下的财政支出效率提升——基于省际间财政支出超效率DEA模型分析[J].财政研究，(7):35-45.Guan Z H,Xu K,Xu W L.2016.Path of fiscal expenditure efficiency promotion under structural tax reductions—Based on inter-provincial’s super-efficiency DEA model[J].Public Finance Research,(7):35-45.(in Chinese)
• 韩华为，苗艳青.2010.地方政府卫生支出效率核算及影响因素实证研究——以中国31个省份面板数据为依据的DEA-Tobit分析[J].财经研究，(5):4-15,39.Han H W,Miao Y Q.2010.Calculation of local health expenditure efficiencies and empirical study on influencing factors:DEA-tobit analysis based on panel data of 31 provinces in China[J].Journal of Finance and Economics,(5):4-15,39.(in Chinese)
• 纪志宏，周黎安，王鹏，等.2014.地方官员晋升激励与银行信贷——来自中国城市商业银行的经验证据[J].金融研究，(1):1-15.Ji Z H,Zhou L A,Wang P,et al.2014.Promotion incentives of local officials and bank lending:Evidence from China’s commercial banks[J].Journal of Financial Research,(1):1-15.(in Chinese)
• 李维安，钱先航.2012.地方官员治理与城市商业银行的信贷投放[J].经济学(季刊),11(4):1239-1260.Li W A,Qian X H.2012.Local official governance and credit supply of the city commercial banks[J].China Economic Quarterly,(4):1239-1260.(in Chinese)
• 李燕凌，欧阳万福.2011.县乡政府财政支农支出效率的实证分析[J].经济研究，46(10):110-122,149.Li Y L,Ouyang W F.2011.Empirical study on efficiency of county and township fiscal expenditure to rural area[J].Economic Research Journal,46(10):110-122,149.(in Chinese)
• 李永友，沈玉平.2009.转移支付与地方财政收支决策——基于省级面板数据的实证研究[J].管理世界，(11):41-53.Li Y Y,Shen Y P.2009.Between transfer expenditure and the decision-making about the financial revenue and expenditure of the local government[J].Management World,(11):41-53.(in Chinese)
• 罗党论，佘国满，陈杰.2015.经济增长业绩与地方官员晋升的关联性再审视——新理论和基于地级市数据的新证据[J].经济学(季刊),14(3):1145-1172.Luo D L,She G M,Chen J.2015.A new re-examination of the relationship between economic performance and local leader’ promotion:New theory and new evidence from city-level data[J].China Economic Quarterly,14(3):1145-1172.(in Chinese)
• 皮建才.2008.中国地方政府间竞争下的区域市场整合[J].经济研究，43(3):115-124.Pi J C.2008.Regional market integration under interjurisdictional competition in China:On the role of the central government in regional market integration[J].Economic Research Journal,43(3):115-124.(in Chinese)
• 亓寿伟，俞杰，陈雅文.2016.中国基础教育支出效率及制度因素的影响——基于局部前沿效率方法的分析[J].财政研究，(6):103-112.Qi S W,Yu J,Chen Y W.2016.The efficiency of China’s basic education spending and the impact of institutional factors—Analysis based on partial frontier efficiency method[J].Public Finance Research,(6):103-112.(in Chinese)
• 唐齐鸣，王彪.2012.中国地方政府财政支出效率及影响因素的实证研究[J].金融研究，(2):48-60.Tang Q M,Wang B.2012.Empirical study on the local government’s financial expenditure efficiency and its influence factors inChina[J].Journal of Financial Research,(2):48-60.(in Chinese)
• 王芳，朱志韬，陈硕.2019.相对绩效考核与自由裁量权：中国县级官员治理考察[J].经济学(季刊),已接收.Wang F,Zhu Z T,Chen S.2019.Relative performance evaluation and discretionary power:Official governence in China[J].China Economic Quarterly,accepted.(in Chinese)
• 王芳，曹一鸣，陈硕.2020.反思环境库兹涅茨曲线假说[J].经济学(季刊),19(1):81-100.Wang F,Cao Y M,Chen S.2020.Re-thinking environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis in China[J].China Economic Quarterly,19(1):81-100.(in Chinese)
• 王芳，陈硕.2020.晋升激励与城镇化——基于地级市数据的证据[J].中国经济问题，(6):74-90.Wang F,Chen S.2020.Local officials’ incentive and urbanization in China[J].China Economic Studies,(6):74-90.(in Chinese)
• 王世磊，张军.2008.中国地方官员为什么要改善基础设施?——一个关于官员激励机制的模型[J].经济学(季刊),7(2):383-398.Wang S L,Zhang J.2008.Why Chinese cadres improve physical infrastructure:modeling the incentive mechanism[J].China Economic Quarterly,7(2):383-398.(in Chinese)
• 王银梅，朱耘婵.2015.基于面板数据的地方政府公共文化支出效率研究[J].经济问题，(6):35-40.Wang Y M,Zhu G C.2015.Research on local public cultural expenditure efficiency based on panel data[J].On Economic Problems,(6):35-40.(in Chinese)
• 徐琰超，杨龙见.2014.财政分权、转移支付与地方政府福利性支出效率[J].金融评论，6(2):37-49,124.Xu Y C,Yang L J.2014.Fiscal decentralization,transfer payments and the efficiency of local government welfare expenditure[J].Journal of Financial Research,6(2):37-49,124.(in Chinese)
• 杨骞，张义凤.2015.中国地方财政支出无效率的来源[J].统计研究，32(4):43-50.Yang Q,Zhang Y F.2015.The source of local fiscal expenditure inefficiency in China[J].Statistical Research,32(4):43-50.(in Chinese)
• 杨其静，郑楠.2013.地方领导晋升竞争是标尺赛、锦标赛还是资格赛[J].世界经济，36(12):130-156.Yang Q J,Zheng N.2013.Is the promotion of local leaders a ruler,championship or qualifier tournament[J].The Journal of World Economy,36(12):130-156.(in Chinese)
• 张军，高远，傅勇，等.2007.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J].经济研究，(3):4-19.Zhang J,Gao Y,Fu Y,et al.2007.Why does China enjoy so much better physical infrastructure?[J].Economic Research Journal,(3):4-19.(in Chinese)
• 张莉，王贤彬，徐现祥.2011.财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为[J].中国工业经济，(4):35-43.Zhang L,Wang X B,Xu X X.2011.Fiscal incentive,political incentive and local officials’ land supply[J].China Industrial Economics,(4):35-43.(in Chinese)
• 张雷宝.2008.行政支出效率评价探究：以浙江省为例[J].中国行政管理，(5):9-12.Zhang L B.2008.Research on the efficiency evaluation of government expenditure:Case study of Zhejiang province[J].Chinese Public Administration,(5):9-12.(in Chinese)
• 张凌云，齐晔.2010.地方环境监管困境解释——政治激励与财政约束假说[J].中国行政管理，(3):93-97.Zhang L Y,Qi Y.2010.Explaining local environmental regulation dilemma:Hypothesis of political incentives and financial restraints[J].Chinese Public Administration,(3):93-97.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2004.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究，(6):33-40.Zhou L A.2004.The incentive and cooperation of government officials in the political tournaments:An interpretation of the prolonged local protectionism and duplicative investments in China[J].Economic Research Journal,(6):33-40.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安，李宏彬，陈烨.2005.相对绩效考核：中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究[J].经济学报，1(1):83-96.Zhou L A,Li H B,Chen Y.2005.Relative performance evaluation:An empirical analysis of turnover of the Chinese local officials[J].China Journal of Economics,1(1):83-96.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2007.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究，(7):36-50.Zhou L A.2007.Governing China’s local officials:an analysis of promotion tournament model[J].Economic Research Journal,(7):36-50.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安，刘冲，厉行，等.2015.“层层加码”与官员激励[J].世界经济文汇，(1):1-15.Zhou L A,Liu C,Li X,et al.2015.“Layer by Layer” and official incentives[J].World Economic Papers,(1):1-15.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2017.转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理[M].2版.上海：格致出版社.Zhou L A.2017.Local government in transition:Official incentive and governance[M].2nd ed.Shanghai:Gezhi Publishing House.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2018.“官场+市场”与中国增长故事[J].社会，38(2):1-45.Zhou L A.2018.“Bureaucratic & Economic Markets” and China’s growth story[J].Chinese Journal of Sociology,38(2):1-45.(in Chinese)
• Abadie A.2005.Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators[J].Review of Economic Studies,72(1):1-19.
• Afonso A,StAubyn M.2005.Non-parametric approaches to education and health efficiency in OECDcountries[J].Journal of Applied Economics,8(2):227-246.
• Athanassopoulos A D,Triantis K P.1998.Assessing aggregate cost efficiency and the related policy implications for greek local municipalities[J].INFOR:Information Systems and Operational Research,36(3):66-83.
• Balaguer-Coll M T,Prior D,Tortosa-Ausina E.2007.On the determinants of local government performance:a two-stage nonparametric approach[J].European Economic Review,51(2):425-451.
• Banker R D,Charnes A,Cooper W W.1984.Some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis[J].Management Science,30(9):1078-1092.
• Besley T,Case A.1995.Incumbent behavior:Vote seeking,tax setting and yardstick competition[J].American Economic Review,85(1):25-45.
• Besley T J,Smart M.2002.Does tax competition raise voter welfare?[R].London School of Economics Working Paper.
• Borge L E,Falch T,Tovmo P.2008.Public sector efficiency:The roles of political and budgetary institutions,fiscal capacity,and democratic participation[J].Public Choice,136(3):475-495.
• Brehm S,Opper S.2015.Economic performance and networks:Political careers in China’s M-form state[J].Business & Economics,14(4):283-302.
• Charnes A,Cooper W W,Rhodes E.1978.Measuring the efficiency of decisionmaking units[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2(6):429-444.
• Chen S,Kung J K S.2016.Of maize and men:The effect of a new world crop on population and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Economic Growth,21(1):71-99.
• DeBorger B,Kerstens K.1996.Cost efficiency of belgian local governments:a comparative analysis of FDH,DEA,and econometric approaches[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,26(2):145-170.
• Dixit A.2002.Incentives and organizations in the public sector:An interpretative review[J].The Journal of Human Resources,37(4):696-727.
• Farrell M J.1957.The measurement of productive efficiency[J].Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Series A (General),120(3):253-290.
• Grossman P J,Mavros P,Wassmer R W.1999.Public sector technical inefficiency in large U.S.cities[J].Journal of Urban Economics,46(2):278-299.
• Han L,Kung J K S.2015.Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Development Economics,116:89-104.
• Heckman J J,Ichimura H,Todd P.1998.Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator[J].Review of Economic Studies,65(2):261-294.
• Hirano K,Imbens G W.2001.Estimation of causal effects using propensity score weighting:an application to data on right heart catheterization[J].Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology,2(3/4):259-278.
• Hirano K,Imbens G W,Ridder G.2003.Efficient estimation of average treatment effects using the estimated propensity score[J].Econometrica,71(4):1161-1189.
• Jia R X,Kudamatsu M,Seim D.2015.Political selection in China:The complementary roles of connections and performance[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,13(4):631-668.
• Lewis W A.1954.Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour[J].The Manchester School,22(2):139-191.
• Li H B,Zhou L A.2005.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,89(9/10):1743-1762.
• Lockwood B,Makris M.2006.Tax incidence,majority voting and capital market integration[J].Journal of Public Economics,90(6/7):1007-1025.
• Milligan K,Moretti E,Oreopoulos P.2004.Does education improve citizenship?Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom[J].Journal of Public Economics,88(9/10):1667-1695.
• Opper S,Nee V,Brehm S.2015.Homophily in the career mobility of China’s political elite[J].Social Science Research,54:332-352.
• Pevcin P.2014.Efficiency levels of sub-national governments:A comparison of SFA and DEA estimations[J].The TQM Journal,26(3):275-283.
• Piotroski J D,Zhang T Y.2014.Politicians and the IPO decision:The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,111(1):111-136.
• Qian Y Y,Weingast B R.1997.Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,11(4):83-92.
• Rayp G,Van De Sijpe N.2007.Measuring and explaining government efficiency in developing countries[J].The Journal of Development Studies,43(2):360-381.
• Silkman R,Young D R.1982.X-efficiency and state formula grants[J].National Tax Journal,35(3):383-397.
• Wang D Q,Zhu Z T,Chen S,et al.2021.Running out of steam?A political incentive perspective ofFDI inflows in China[J].Journal of International Business Studies,52(1):692-717.
• Xi T Y,Yao Y,Zhang M Y.2018.Capability and opportunism:evidence from city officials in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,46(4):1046-1061.
• Xu C G.2011.Thefundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development[J].Journal of Economic Literature,49(4):1076-1151.
• (1)例如,Borger and Kerstens(1996)利用包括DEA在内的五种方法核算了比利时各地市的财政支出效率,并对不同方法获得的结果进行了比较。Afonso and Aubyn(2005)核算了23个OECD国家的政府效率,作者发现日本、瑞士、澳大利亚、美国及卢森堡等国的效率相对较高。Pevsin(2014) 核算了200个斯洛文尼亚城市2011年的政府支出效率。
• (2)比如Balaguer-Coll et al.(2007)和Rayp and Van De Sijpe(2007)分别利用西班牙数据和52个发展中国家数据的实证发现地方政府的财政支出效率会受到财政收入来源、经济发展水平以及人口特征的影响;Athanassopoulos and Triantis(1998)、Grossman et al.(1999)也认为人口密度对政府效率有影响。Borger and Kerstens(1996)在核算比利时各地市的财政支出效率时发现,公众教育水平对政府支出效率有正向作用,而财政补贴及支出结构则起负向作用。Milligan et al.(2004)认为教育能提高受教育者的政治行动力和识别能力,进而监督决策者提高政府支出效率。
• (3)例如,Li and Zhou (2005)基于中国1979—1995年的省级经济增长与官员调动数据,发现省级领导人晋升可能性随着其GDP增长率的提高而增加。后续研究基于地市级及县级数据对该假说展开进一步检验,其获得的发现也基本上认同经济绩效对提高晋升概率的显著作用(王芳等,2019;罗党论等,2015;杨其静和郑楠,2013)。
• (4)这些研究包括中国基础设施投资的快速增长(王世磊和张军,2008;张军等,2007)、财政支出结构的扭曲(傅勇和张晏,2007;傅勇,2010)、地方保护主义现象(皮建才,2008;周黎安,2004)、银行信贷的不正常波动(纪志宏等,2014)、IPO行为的周期性变化(Piotroski and Zhang,2014)、官员对土地出让行为的热衷(张莉等,2011)、土地及人口城市化的不均衡发展(王芳和陈硕,2020)、环保支出不足(王芳等,2020;李维安和钱先航,2012;张凌云和齐晔,2010)等等。
• (5)计算基本建设支出效率所需要的“基本建设支出”项在2006年后因收支科目调整而不可得。我们采用如下方法估算出该指标分地级市指标:首先,结合该指标2004—2006年平均增长率及2006年值预测2007年取值;其次,基于2006年之后可得的分省“交通运输支出”数值计算历年增长率作为“基本建设支出”2006年之后增长率的近似值;最后,结合2007年“基本建设支出”预测值及“交通运输支出”分省增长率估算出“基本建设支出”在2006年之后的分地级市值。
• (6)支出效率最低的10个城市依次是:崇左、泸州、德阳、眉山、自贡、来宾、百色、咸宁、武威及吕梁;支出效率最高的10个城市依次是:深圳、东莞、中山、海口、珠海、潍坊、临沂、秦皇岛、宁波及威海。
• (7)根据《中华人民共和国公务员法》第十八条显示,领导干部按照职级高低一共被划分为十个等级;同时,该法规第四十五条和第四十条规定,“公务员领导职务应当逐级晋升”。根据《党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定》,“党政领导职务每个任期为5年”;实际执行则略有调整。以地市市委书记为例,其任期最短为1年、最长则超过8年以上,平均任期为3.6年(耿曙等,2016)。
• (8)上表中非括号内的数值为党代会召开前三年中该变量的平均水平或增长率在相应地区内的均值,括号中的数值为相应标准误。数据来源:《中国城市统计年鉴》。
• (9)在得到扩权倾向值p后,我们以1作为实际发生了扩权县回归权重,以p/(1-p)作为未扩权县的权重。通过这种估计方法得到的估计量为“处理组平均处理效应”(Average Treatment Effect on the Treated)。
• (10)上表中非括号内的数值为党代会召开前三年中该变量的平均水平在相应地区内的均值,括号中的数值为相应标准误。数据来源:《中国城市统计年鉴》。
• (11)由于该地级市在党代会之后换届与否和地级市固定效应完全共线,因此changei的作用被包含在pi的估计结果中而没有汇报。
• (12)如 Wang et al.(2020)通过使用2000—2011年的数据研究发现,中国有60%的城市领导人在任期内选择通过空间扩张而非优化结构的摊大饼式方式来发展当地经济。
• (13)基于同样是官员任命制的西班牙市级政府数据,Balaguer-Coll et al.(2007)的研究就发现其财政资金中来自上级政府补助的比例越高,地方政府的财政支出效率越低。