张弘

• 1:清华大学经济管理学院经济系

摘要(Abstract)：

本文研究了担保机构在信贷市场中的作用。针对信贷市场信息不对称下的过度信贷情形,建立理论模型,分析担保机构促进银行筛选项目、改善信贷市场福利的条件和作用机制。结果显示,具有信息优势和资产处置优势的担保机构能够通过提升临界概率、降低资产处置成本来提升信贷市场福利;当担保机构具有完全的信息优势并对债权全额担保时,可以达到社会最优状态。市场化的担保机构追逐利润最大化的动机能提升其信息优势和资产处置优势,扩大担保份额,最终使得担保水平达到社会合意值。

关键词(KeyWords)： 担保机构;过度信贷;信息优势;资产处置优势;激励相容

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 张弘

DOI: 10.16513/j.cnki.cje.2019.01.004

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• http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/2011061571758C93ECD39091FFBD281CFE2D8600.html
• http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/50FFCFFC8CAD4D25ADD3C8DAE8A14CD9.html
• (1)“目前各国的中小企业信用担保机构大部分属于政策性信用担保机构,大都以执行国家的经济产业政策为目的,而不是以单纯营利为目的。为了保障担保业务的顺利进行,政府每年都要为担保机构注入部分资本金,担保项目的最终赔付也由政府承担。”
• (2)“以中央和地方两级财政支持的政策性融资担保体系是西方发达国家小企业和中小企业的基础增信体系,这一基础增信体系除了在德国、美国、日本、韩国获得较好应用之外,在英国、法国、芬兰、加拿大等国亦被普遍采用……各国中央财政在分担小企业信用风险中发挥了主导作用,分担了大部分信用风险。这与我国过去10年大力推进引导民间资本进入融资担保业的政策做法并不一致……”
• (1)根据Cressy and Aernoudt(2000),会员互助担保以会员机制为基础,设立互助担保协会,基于会员间相互了解和信息分享,为会员向银行借款提供担保。通常政府不直接参与互助担保,也有一些国家(如德国)由政府为会员担保体系提供再担保。
• (1)在Merton and Bodie(1992)等研究中,资产限制也会作为风险管理的一种工具。
• (1)根据《银行业金融机构与融资担保公司业务合作指引》(银保监发[2018]1号)第十条“银行应当依据担保公司的资信状况,依法合理确定担保公司的担保额度”,模型中担保机构承担责任份额K是指,对于1单位贷款的还款额R,担保机构按照约定实际承担偿付风险的部分。
• (2)根据《担保法》第四条和《物权法》第一百七十一条,第三人为债务人向债权人提供担保的,可以要求债务人提供反担保,适用《担保法》、《物权法》和其他法律的规定。具体到担保机构参与的信贷关系中,企业为债务人,银行为债权人,担保机构为提供担保的第三人,因此,此时作为债务人的企业,用自身资产为上述担保关系进行反向担保,即为反担保。实务中,反担保是担保机构的风险控制的重要手段。
• (1)担保机构的零利润条件针对的是临界项目的竞争均衡。结合2.2.2和2.2.3担保机构利润表达式,无论担保机构是否掌握、掌握多少项目信息,担保机构的互相竞争体现在,制定统一的担保费率f使得临界项目的利润为0。因此,式(5)、(6)、(7)实质是担保机构针对临界借款项目实现零利润的定价条件,而非针对所有借款项目(p≥p)实现总利润为零的定价条件。