龙腾,王海军,王志阁

• 1:广东财经大学财政税务学院
• 2:北京物资学院经济学院中国投资者教育与保护中心
• 3:广东财经大学智能财会管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

良好的财政规则约束是建立规范化财政治理体系的重要内容。本文利用欧盟委员会财政规则数据集(ECFRD)实证分析了实施财政规则对顺周期财政政策的影响作用，并从经济周期波动的角度，分析第二代财政规则的周期平衡特征。本文研究发现，第一，政府实施财政规则能够显著降低财政政策的顺周期特性，缓释顺周期财政风险。第二，从分类别财政规则来看，支出规则和债务规则能够有效地控制顺周期财政风险，收入规则同预算平衡规则的影响并不显著。第三，在第二代财政规则中，支出规则对财政政策顺周期的影响系数有显著提升，收入规则并无明显变化，而预算平衡规则与债务规则转变为非显著影响，实施效果的时滞性可能是产生这一现象的重要原因。第四，拥有监督机制和违规制裁特征的财政规则能够提升其对顺周期特性的约束效果，而提升财政规则的公开性和灵活性强度会在一定程度上促进国家财政的顺周期特性。本文经验证明表示，探索建立正式的财政规则制度有助于我国建立现代财政治理体系，促进财政可持续发展，进一步保障逆周期性财政政策的稳定性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 财政规则;财政政策;经济周期;顺周期风险

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目“新时代我国区域开放空间格局优化与战略支撑研究”(71861034);; 国家社会科学基金一般项目“基于准技术前沿的我国创新发展的实现路径与制度保证研究”(19BJL014);; 云南省财税学科平台建设项目“政府间财政关系和地方财税政策”(C6176602);; 湖南省教育厅科学研究重点项目“基于激励相容的城市环境治理长效机制与政策体系研究”(编号:20A189)的资助

作者(Author): 龙腾,王海军,王志阁

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• (1)即通过税收协商解决外部性问题,税收和协商都允许经济当事人为了实现目标通过成本收益比较选择最佳方案。在本文的语境下,税收外部性内部化能够通过内化(或者说“平均化”“无倾向化”)社会成本来缓解政府在逆周期阶段可能造成政策扭曲。
• (2)顺周期陷阱(procyclicality trap),是指国家在经济发展过程中,政府长期执行顺周期财政政策,并且出于各种原因,这种政策风向难以得到改变(Frankel,2011)。
• (3)财政规则评价表的评价细则来源于ECFRD(European Commission Fiscal Rules Dataset),本文在借鉴ECFRD的原则上,主要采用虚拟变量(0和1)的方式对各类财政规则进行赋值。限于本文篇幅原因,本文仅对各类财政规则的评价原则做引导简述,各类型财政规则的具体赋分标准没有在正文中列出,有兴趣者可以自行查找。
• (4)以立法层级特征为例,若财政规则是政府的政治承诺计1分,规则基于联合协议或由不同政府层级达成的协议计2分,规则根据普通法律制定计3分,规则进入宪法计4分。
• (5)监督机制强度包括独立监管机构、预警机制、独立执行机构;违规制裁强度包括惩罚机制;公开性和灵活性强度包括可调整度、例外条款等条例。
• (6)由于在2007年之后,欧盟各成员国实施预算平衡规则和债务规则的数据一致,因此该部分实证结果相同。
• (7)由于样本为欧盟成员国家,因此在成员国内通过实施收入法案限制政府收入增长、规定增税或者撤销支出会同时受到立法者和选民的双重阻力(Eliason and Lutz,2018)。